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1. Introduction 
 
The assumption of stable exogenous preferences is crucial for neoclassical economic 
theory.  Without it one cannot infer the causal connection between changes in opportunity 
sets and predicted changes in choices under the neoclassical framework. Consequently, if 
preferences are endogenous, and get affected by the very policies themselves, it is not 
possible to isolate and evaluate the effects of a new policy or a change in a policy.  
  While the assumptions of homogeneous non-mutable preferences have remained 
mostly sacrosanct in neoclassical economic theory (barring a few early exceptions as in 
Pollak (1976), Elster (1979), Winston (1980), West and McKee (1983), Hirschman 
(1984), and Cowen (1989)), recent years have witnessed a renewed interest in evaluating 
the plausibility of these assumptions. There is a developing strand of research that claims 
preferences to be endogenous, acquired, and mutable, amenable to reconstructions and 
exogenous influence (see Ariely et al. (2005)). This literature suggests that there are a 
number of factors – exogenous as well as endogenous – such as our efforts, experiences, 
evolving norms, advertising, exposure to different cultures, conflict, and catastrophic 
events that can strongly influence and modify preferences in many domains of economic 
choice (see for example Hoeffler and Ariely (1999), Ariely et al. (2003), Ariely et al. 
(2005), Bowles (2009), Eckel et al. (2009), Castillo and Carter (2011), Voors et al. 
(2012), and Dean and Sautmann (2014) among others).  
In their seminal article Stigler and Becker (1977) suggest that an economist faced 
with evidences of apparent inconsistencies in temporal choices should consider a 
framework of state contingent preferences rather than rely on the arbitrariness of evolving 
preferences. They posit that preferences should be defined over different state spaces 
such that choices can be state specific, and therefore, what appears to be preference 
inconsistency—and hence changing preferences, can now be rationalized in the familiar 
framework of stable exogenous preferences when choices are state-contingent. Their 
proposed framework brings us back to a preference relation that is globally stable but can 
accommodate differences in choices that are state-specific. In this world, observed 
	   3 
differences in choices, temporally or across individuals need not necessarily lead to an 
inconsistency in traditional economic theory and observed data anymore.  
What constitutes an appropriate state remains an open question. Stigler and 
Becker (1977) primarily consider prices and income as the state variables. So the states 
could certainly include the economic opportunities faced by individuals such as 
employment opportunities. Additionally, Andersen et al. (2008) suggest that states can 
include features as trivial as the weather, or as critical as the individual’s mortality risk.1 
The critical assumption here is that the state space must be orthogonal to individuals’ 
choices. Understandably, due to the nature of temporal data that is needed to evaluate 
such a proposition, the task becomes harder, and consequently the empirical validation 
for the Stigler-Becker framework remains sparse. Researchers not only need panel 
observations to test the theory, but also need to be able to identify state spaces that 
change exogenously.  
In this paper we utilize an exogenous change in the state space/opportunity set of 
individuals that allows us to examine stability in preferences under the Stigler-Becker 
state-dependent framework. This exogenous change is the result of an experimental 
intervention. Women residing in specific slums of New Delhi, India were invited to 
participate in an artefactual field experiment; the first round was conducted in 2010, and 
the second one a year later in 2011. In the one-year between the two experiments, 
participants through a public lottery were randomly allocated to receive access to a six-
month subsidized vocational training program. This is a clear exogenous change in the 
opportunity set of a randomly selected set of women. The random assignment of 
participants to the vocational training program, by its very design, gives us a unique way 
of providing direct evidence on the issue of temporally stable preferences where the state 
space is being changed with experimental control, and remains orthogonal to subject 
decisions. This constitutes an important innovation of our study. 
Recent work by Straznicka (2012) uses multiple elicitation methods to test for 
temporal stability of risk preferences at the individual level as well as at the aggregate 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 While weather shocks can be a useful backdrop for looking at choices before and after the shock, 
natural disasters mostly come unannounced. This can restrict the ideal comparison of choices (see 
Eckel et al. 2009 for an interesting examination of risk preferences after a storm). 
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level controlling for personality traits and performances in a market game. Zeisberger et 
al. (2012) focused on the stability of prospect theory parameters over a one-year period. 
Both papers find considerable temporal stability in preferences. However, they do not use 
the state-dependent framework, and instead focus exclusively on reporting subject 
behavior over time. The paper closest to ours is by Andersen et al. (2008), who use the 
notion of state dependent preferences and examine temporal stability in risk preferences 
using panel data collected for the Danish population over a 17-month period. In contrast 
to our approach, they use survey questionnaires as a way to identify state space. 
Understandably, this can lead to problems of endogeneity and self-reported bias in 
identifying state spaces. Andersen et al. (2008) conclude that although there is some 
variation in risk attitudes over time, there is no general tendency for the risk attitudes to 
either increase or decrease temporally.  
To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first to provide evidence relating 
to the issue of stability in preferences using the state-dependent framework. Specifically 
we: (i) introduce states of nature that are exogenously determined for the subjects with 
experimental control; (ii) use a unique panel data separated by a year, on behavioral 
choices relating to risk preference, competition, and measures of confidence from low-
income households; (iii) combine data from an artefactual field experiment and responses 
from primary surveys; (iv) control for changes in the socioeconomic environment; and (v) 
provide alternate empirical strategies to evaluate preference stability in our state-
contingent framework.  
 Our results suggest that risk and competitive preferences are consistent with the 
Stigler-Becker framework of state dependent choices and are temporally stable. For our 
measure of confidence we find some influence of experience/task specific learning. 
Comparing across subjects however, we find considerable variability across subject 
choices even after controlling for the variation in state space at a point in time. Overall 
our results lend qualified support to the often-used adage in economic theory “De 
Gustibus Non Est Disputandum!”2 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 "Tastes neither change capriciously nor differ importantly between people. [Tastes] will be there 
next year, too, and are the same to all men.” (Stigler and Becker (1977), page 76). 
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2. Experimental Design and Data 
In 2010 two non-governmental organizations based in New Delhi in India (Pratham and 
SATYA, Social Awakening Through Youth Action) jointly offered a 6-months long, 
subsidized vocational training program in stitching and tailoring to women who were 
between the ages of 18 and 39, had completed at least 5 grades of completed schooling, 
and were residents of specific slums of New Delhi. More information on the actual 
intervention is presented in Maitra and Mani (2013). The artefactual field experiments 
that we utilize in this paper were conducted as a part of the impact evaluation of this 
intervention. A subset of the applicants to the training program (a total of 121 women) 
participated in the artefactual field experiment both in 2010 (pre-intervention), and in 
2011 (5-months post-intervention). Of these participants, 82 women were ultimately 
assigned to the treatment group (received the training) and the remaining 39 were 
assigned to the control group (did not receive the training). Assignment to the treatment 
was determined through a public lottery. The experimental sessions in 2010 (the baseline 
experiment) were conducted before the lottery to determine treatment status. The follow-
up experiments in 2011 were conducted five months after the completion of the program. 
Since the assignment to the training program was randomized and unknown to the 
subjects, to the researchers, and the associated non-governmental organizations at the 
time of the pre-intervention sessions, the change in the opportunity set for those who 
were included in the training program can be treated as exogenous. To verify that the 
assumption of exogenous realizations of the state space is indeed valid, we report 
separately the baseline averages of the outcome variables of interest (see Panel A, Table 
1) for those in the treatment and the control group. We discuss these in more detail 
below.   
 Attrition is always a concern whenever subjects are followed over time. For 
example, Andersen et al. (2008) are able to track only 38 percent of their baseline 
participants in subsequent visits, with a consequent attrition rate of 62 percent. In our 
study the attrition rate from the baseline to the follow-up experiment is 17.12 percent. 
Importantly, there are no statistically significant differences (p-value = 0.98, t-test) in the 
attrition rates across subjects from the treatment group (17.17 percent) and the control 
	   6 
group (17.02 percent). In our framework attrition rates can result in additional concerns 
especially if it were found to be endogenous to the treatment status/state space. Unlike in 
Andersen et al. (2008), in which the orthogonality between state space and attrition 
cannot be fully verified, in our paper we verify statistically the absence of any state 
specific attrition behavior.  
2.1 Experimental Games  
In 2010, each subject participated in two games (similar to those reported in Gneezy et al. 
(2009)). The first, an investment game, was designed to evaluate subjects’ attitudes 
towards risk. In this game, participants were endowed with Rs 50 and had the option to 
allocate any portion of their endowment to a risky asset that had a 50% chance of 
quadrupling the amount invested. The invested amount could also be lost with a 50% 
probability. A coin flip decided the outcome. The subjects retained any amount that they 
chose not to invest.  
 The second game, designed to investigate the intrinsic competitiveness of subjects 
(competition game), consisted of a real-effort task that determined payoffs in the 
competition game. The real-effort task consisted of filling up 1.5 fl oz. zip lock bags with 
beans in one minute. Our choice of the real-effort task was specific to our field 
conditions. We chose a real effort task that would be an easily comprehensible task for all 
our participants. Prior to participating in the real-effort task each subject had to choose 
one of two possible methods of compensation, a piece-rate compensation method (where 
payoffs depended solely on their own performance) or a competition-rate compensation 
method (where the subject’s earnings depended on her performance relative to a 
randomly chosen subject in the same session). In the piece-rate method a subject received 
Rs. 4 for each correctly filled bag; while in the competition-rate method a subject 
received Rs. 16 per bag if she filled at least as many bags as her matched opponent, and 
received nothing if she had filled less bags than the matched opponent. While choosing 
the compensation method, the subjects were also asked to guess how many bags they 
expected to fill up, and their expected relative rank based on their bag-filling 
performance. More discussion of the tasks is presented in Dasgupta et al. (2014).  
 In 2011, we made minor changes to the presentation of games described above in 
	   7 
an attempt to minimize the effect of learning or familiarity with these games. In the 
investment game, we chose to roll a 6-sided die where ‘1, 2, 3’ determined success of the 
investment and ‘4, 5, 6’ resulted in failure of the investment (instead of using a coin to 
demonstrate the 50 percent probability). In the competition game, we changed the size of 
the zip lock bag and the bean type used in the real effort task to make it less obvious for 
participants to use their own last years’ performances as a benchmark or anchor for their 
absolute performance. The instructions used in 2010 are available in Appendix 2. 
 While every subject participated in both the games in a session, only one of the 
games was chosen for payment purposes. This was explained at the very beginning. Each 
subject participated in only one session every year where an average session lasted for 
about 2 hrs. The average payment received from participation was Rs. 203 (including a 
show-up fee of Rs 150).3  
We construct four outcome variables of interest based on observed choices: (a) 
the CRRA coefficient derived from choices in the investment game4; (b) an indicator for 
competitiveness that takes a value 1 if the subject chooses the competitive wage scheme 
in the competition game, and 0 otherwise; (c) a measure for self ranking which takes a 
value between 1 and 5 (5 best, 1 worst) to capture subjects’ perceptions of relative 
rankings of their expected performances in the competition game compared to other 
subjects in the session; (d) a measure of overconfidence, computed as the ratio of 
expected number of bags filled in the competition game divided by the actual number of 
bags filled in the game. We define a value less than 1 to be reflective of under-confidence 
and a value greater than 1 reflective of overconfidence. Panel A in Table 1 presents the 
baseline averages of these outcomes variables, both for the full sample and also 
separately by eventual status (treatment or control group) in the randomized training 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 The official minimum wages for unskilled workers in Delhi was Rs 203 per day at the time of 
running these experiments (in 2010). The minimum wage legislations are however rarely imposed 
in India, and most women in our sample would be receiving less than this stipulated amount. 
Cardenas and Carpenter (2008) in their survey of field experiments in developing countries argue 
that paying on average one to two days wage for a half-day session creates the necessary salience 
for participants in the field (page 331). For a two-hour session that we conducted, a day’s worth of 
wages satisfies this criterion. The exchange rate at the time of running these experiments was $1 
(US) = Rs 46. 
4 See Appendix 1 for a discussion on the derivation of the CRRA coefficient for our task.  
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program intervention. Panel B of Table 1 presents the corresponding averages of a set of 
socioeconomic characteristics (age in years, level of education, dummies for caste (SC, 
ST, and OBC), marital status, ownership of house, and participation in a Rotating 
Savings and Credit Association (ROSCA)).  These variables are used in the regressions 
(see below). 
 The mean difference between the two groups (reported in Column 4, Table 1) is 
statistically not significant even at the 10 percent significance level for all outcome 
variables and socioeconomic characteristics except self-ranking. Further, when we 
conduct a test of joint significance of differences of all the baseline characteristics 
(outcomes and socioeconomic characteristics), we cannot reject that the baseline 
characteristics of women in the treatment and control groups are same (F-stat = 1.25, p-
value = 0.25). The balance in characteristics at the baseline indicates that the random 
assignment into the treatment and control group was successful, thus establishing the fact 
that the change in opportunity set for the treatment group was indeed exogenous. 
 
3. Conceptual Framework  
3.1 State Space and Exogeneity 
In this section we introduce the implications of the state dependent choices in the context 
of our experiment design and outline the associated testable predictions. Stigler and 
Becker (1977) maintain that preferences are exogenously determined, state-dependent, 
and homogeneous across individuals. Consequently, any heterogeneity in choices either 
within-subjects temporally, or across-subjects should be traced back to any possible 
difference in state spaces, i.e., underlying opportunity sets. When we assume choices to 
be state dependent, one needs to question whether changes in state spaces (opportunity 
sets) are necessary conditions for changes in observed choices or whether they are merely 
sufficient. Stigler and Becker seem to suggest that they are both.5 So any change in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 “… stable behavior by (say) households faced with stable prices and incomes—or more 
generally a stable environment—is no contradiction since stability then is implied as much by 
personal interest theories as by custom and tradition. On the other hand, stable behavior in the face 
of changing prices and incomes might contradict the approach taken in this essay that assumes 
utility maximizing with stable tastes” (Stigler and Becker (1977), page 82) 
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observed choices must be due to underlying changes in states (opportunity sets), and 
furthermore, a no-change in state space (opportunity sets) must imply a corresponding 
no-change in observed choices. Note though, while our design allows us to rationalize 
observed changes via state dependency, the Stigler-Becker framework obviously does not 
imply that choices will necessarily change even if the underlying state space has 
changed. Hence a no-change in observed choices remains consistent with stability in 
preferences in the Stigler-Becker world even if the underlying state space has changed.  
3.2 Testable Implications 
Recall that in the baseline experiment, since none of the participants had yet been placed 
into the Treatment (T) or the Control group (C), there is no difference in the set of 
opportunities. Hence observed experimental choices should be the same (controlling for 
differences in any other observable characteristics). In the follow-up experiment in 2011, 
the opportunity set of T has changed while the opportunity set of C remains the same. 
Consequently, there should be no change in choices for subjects in C, and if one observes 
different choices temporally for T, it is due to the change in their opportunity sets. It is 
useful to note here that this change in opportunity set was considerable – Maitra and 
Mani (2013) in their evaluation of the training program show that assignment to 
training/treatment increased individual’s monthly income by 150% relative to the control 
group.  
 Our above discussion allows us to formulate the five propositions below to 
evaluate the empirical validity of stable preferences in our experiment.  
 
Testable propositions on homogeneity of subject preferences: 
P1: In the 2010 wave, there are no differences in observed choices (using each of the four 
variables) across subjects. 
P2: In the 2011 wave, there are no differences in observed choices (using each of the four 
variables) across subjects in the treatment group (T).  
P3: In the 2011 wave, there are no differences in observed choices (using each of the four 
variables) across subjects in the control group (C). 
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Testable propositions on temporal stability of subject preferences: 
P4: There are differences in observed choices (using each of the four variables) in the 
experimental games temporally, for subjects in the treatment group (T). 
P5: There are no differences in observed choices (using each of the four variables) in the 
experimental games temporally, for subjects in the control group (C).  
 
4. Empirical Tests on Preference Stability 
In this section we examine the validity of propositions P1 – P5 using our experimental 
data. We first report tests on homogeneity of subject preferences followed by the analysis 
of inter-temporal stability of preferences.  
4.1 Homogeneity of Subject Preferences 
Empirical support of the homogeneity of subject preferences requires that choices are 
concentrated around the mean. To ascertain whether this is observed in our data we 
propose two definitions of stability. First, we define subjects to exhibit strong preference 
stability if more than 90 percent of subject choices lie within 0.05 standard deviation of 
the mean; analogously, we define subjects to exhibit weak stability if more than 90 
percent of subject choices lie within 0.10 standard deviation of the mean. To examine if 
preferences are homogenous we construct a z-score for each of the following choice 
variables: CRRA coefficient, self ranking, and overconfidence. The z-score is constructed 
by subtracting the mean of the sample from the individual subject choice and this 
difference is further divided by the standard deviation. The z-score measures of CRRA 
coefficient, self-ranking, and overconfidence are measured in standard deviation units.6 
The results on strong and weak preference stability are presented in Table 2. We 
find substantial heterogeneity in choices across subjects in 2010. Using the weak stability 
criteria defined above, we find 0%, 27.2%, and 7.4% of subject choices respectively for 
CRRA coefficient, self-ranking, and overconfidence lie within 0.10 standard deviation of 
the mean in 2010. The dispersion is starker using the strong stability criterion: we find 
0% of subject choices for each of the three variables to lie within 0.05 standard deviation 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Since the indicator for competitiveness is not a continuous variable we do not include it in our z-
score measures. In our alternative tests of homogeneity we include the choice data on 
competitiveness. 
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of the mean in 2010. In year 2011 as well, we observe substantial heterogeneity in subject 
choices within the T and in the C group separately, using both the strong and the weak 
stability criteria (see Table 2). A one-tailed standard deviation test rejects the null 
hypotheses H0: σ = 0.05 as well as H0: σ = 0.10 against their corresponding alternative 
hypotheses HA: σ > 0.05 and HA: σ > 0.10 (p-value < 0.01) for each of our measures in 
2010 for the pooled sample, and in 2011 separately for the T group and the C group.  
We also use a cross-sectional regression framework to test for homogeneity in 
observed choices. The regression approach allows us to remove other observed sources of 
variation in choices arising from differences in socioeconomic characteristics. To do this, 
the four choice variables are regressed on the vector of exogenous regressors reported in 
Panel B of Table 1. We use the residuals from these regressions, that is, the unexplained 
variation in choices (removing any explained source of variation arising from variation in 
possible observable exogenous states of nature) to test for homogeneity in choices in our 
state dependent framework.7 If there are no observed variations in the residual terms for 
each of the outcomes then that is consistent with the idea of homogeneity in state 
contingent choices. A one-tailed standard deviation test rejects the nulls: H0: σ = 0.05 as 
well as H0: σ = 0.10 against their corresponding alternative hypotheses: HA: σ > 0.05 and 
HA: σ > 0.10 for each of the residuals capturing unexplained variation in the subject 
choice measures for the 2010 pooled sample and for the 2011 treatment and control group 
separately at the 1% level of significance (p-value < 0.01) for all tests and outcome 
measures. 
Using our proposed measures we therefore do not find empirical support for 
propositions P1 – P3 and conclude that there exists significant cross-sectional 
heterogeneity in choices. This implies that a representative average preference measure 
for a group can hide considerable heterogeneity across subjects and can therefore be a 
noisy measure, from a policy perspective. 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 The regression results used to obtain the residual terms are available upon request from the 
authors.  
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4.2 Inter-temporal stability of preferences 
We present four different approaches to evaluate propositions P4 and P5. First, we 
compute the within-subject differences in choices for each participant across the two 
years using a two-sided t-test; the corresponding mean and the standard deviation of the 
within subject differences in choices are reported in Column 1 of Table 3. If these 
differences are on average equal to zero, they indicate stable temporal preferences. The 
associated p-values are presented in Column 2 of Table 3 for the control and treatment 
groups in Panels A and B respectively. These provide some evidence that the average 
within subject differences in choices is zero for three of the four indicators. The results 
for overconfidence however are not consistent with stable preferences. We discuss this in 
more detail later.  
Although intuitive, the above technique does not correct for the possibility that 
large but opposite changes in participant behavior cancel each other out to make the 
average appear close to zero. Examining the distribution of changes instead, and testing 
for unimodality addresses this problem. This is our second approach. We examine 
whether the distribution of the within subject difference in choices (across the two years) 
is unimodal at zero. Figures 1 and 2 present the corresponding distributions of the within 
subject differences in choices for each of our four indicators separately for women in the 
treatment (Figure 1) and control (Figure 2) groups. The associated mean, median, and 
inter-quartile range (25th-75th percentile) of the within subject differences in choices for 
the four variables (CRRA coefficient, competitiveness, self ranking, and overconfidence) 
are also provided in Panels A (for control group) and B (for treatment group) of Table 3. 
With the exception of overconfidence they support the observations that (1) the 
distributions have no apparent tendency to be positive or negative; and (2) they peak at 
zero. 
The third approach to evaluate temporal stability is to examine the variance of 
the distribution of changes and compare the levels of dispersion within and across 
subjects. For choices to exhibit temporal stability in subject preferences, variation in 
choices over time should be less than the variation in choices across subjects in a given 
point in time (see Andersen et al. (2008)). That is, an empirical support for temporally 
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stable choices would require that within-subject variance should be less than the between 
subject variance (i.e., 𝜎!! < 𝜎!!). Table 4 reports the variance decomposition analysis 
separately for women in the two groups. To evaluate P4 and P5, there are eight necessary 
comparisons we make using each of our four measures. For the Control group (Panel A, 
Table 4), we find that the between subject variance is always greater than the within 
subject variance for three of the four measures. The lone exception is overconfidence 
where the inequality goes in the opposite direction.  
In the Treatment group (Panel B, Table 4) we find that the between subject 
variance is greater than the within subject variance for competitiveness and self-ranking. 
For the CRRA and the overconfidence measure we find the inequality go in the opposite 
direction. Here however, a reversal in the inequality of the between and within subject 
variance, is consistent with state dependent choices: a situation where within-subject 
dispersions are relatively larger (than between-subjects) can be attributed to the 
underlying change in the state space, and is therefore consistent with state dependent 
choices within a stable preference theory (see Stigler and Becker (1977)). The 
overconfidence measure however, which exhibits a similar pattern in both the C and the 
T group needs further explanation. Recall that our measure of overconfidence is 
constructed as a ratio of expected number of bags to the actual number of bags filled for 
every subject. The choice data reveals that in the baseline treatment, without any prior 
experience with the real effort task, all participants systematically overestimated the 
number of bags they were likely to fill. In the follow up year, the subjects (independent of 
being in the T or C group) seem to have taken into account their experience from the 
baseline and considerably tightened their performance estimates.8 We therefore believe 
that the observed variation in overconfidence is reflective of participant’s experience and 
learning from the baseline.  
Finally, our fourth approach evaluates temporal stability of subject choices 
controlling for pre-intervention socioeconomic characteristics (collected using primary 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 The mean level of overconfidence is 2.86 in 2010 and 2.15 in 2011. The standard deviation of 
overconfidence is 2.16 in 2010 and 1.66 in 2011. The mean and the standard deviation are both 
considerably lower with time. 
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surveys). We estimate the following empirical specification controlling for changes in the 
realization of the exogenous states of nature captured through the treatment dummy.  
 ∆𝐵! = 𝛽!  +  𝛽!  𝑇! + 𝛾! 𝑋!"!!!! + 𝜖! (1) 
The dependent variable in the above equation are changes in our four outcome variables 
of interest over time for each subject. The set of explanatory variables include the 
treatment dummy (𝑇! = 1 if assigned to the treatment group, 0 otherwise), and a vector of 
pre-intervention characteristics 𝑋!" . Temporal stability in preferences for the control 
group is captured by the intercept term in the regression, and a failure to reject the null of 𝛽! = 0 is consistent with the notion of temporal stability in preferences for the control 
group. For the Treatment group the constraints are less restrictive. Notice, in our state 
dependent framework, changes in observed choices temporally can be readily accounted 
for by the underlying changes in state space, while a no-change in observed choice is also 
consistent with temporally stable preferences. Failing to reject the joint test on the 
intercept (𝛽!) and the treatment dummy (𝛽!) would be consistent with the latter. 
The regression results from equation (1) are provided in Table 5 below. We fail 
to reject the null that the intercept is equal to zero even at the 10% significance level, 
consistently across Columns 1 – 4; additionally the joint test 𝛽! + 𝛽! = 0 can also never 
be rejected. This suggests that our subject choices are consistent with temporal stability in 
preferences for both groups.  
 
5. Conclusion   
We introduce a novel design to investigate the empirical plausibility of stable exogenous 
preferences where choices are assumed to be a function of state space. We make use of a 
randomized intervention, to examine the impact of exogenously varying opportunity sets 
faced by participants and evaluate their attitudes towards competitiveness and risk 
preferences pre-intervention and post-intervention. Using multiple empirical strategies, 
we find that these two characteristics remain temporally stable for subjects in a state-
dependent framework. Measures of confidence however, appear to be task-dependent and 
can depend on previous experience with the task. In addition, we fail to find empirical 
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support for homogeneous preferences across individuals controlling for state spaces. This 
suggests that one needs to be careful in using a representative average measure for 
preferences when considering policy implementations given the heterogeneity of 
preferences in the constituent subgroups. 
Can preferences then be assumed to be exogenous for all practical purposes? Or, 
are they mostly mutable? Hirschman (1984) distinguishes between preferences and meta-
preferences, where preferences are primary “tastes” and meta-preferences are mutable 
“values” that can change (as also in Sen (1977)). This provides a useful framework to put 
into perspective some of the recent results on mutable preferences (see for example, 
Ariely et al. (2003), Ariely et al. (2005), Ariely and Norton (2008) and Amir and Levav 
(2008)) as well as results reported in Meier and Sprenger (2010), and most recently ours, 
that point towards certain preferences to be more stable than others. While it is plausible 
and intuitive that economic transactions such as putting effort, repeated exposure, and 
experience can indeed influence preferences (Hoeffler and Ariely (1999)), it is not an odd 
observation however, that some are born more courageous, or indulge in greater risk-
taking than many others, independent of the state of nature they face. The latter are 
indeed “tastes” about which you do not argue – De Gustibus Non Est Disputandum! On 
the other hand, a taste about which one might argue, stops being a taste – by definition it 
turns into “value” that can be mutable as Ulysses’s behavior when exposed to the songs 
of the sirens! 
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Figure 1: Distribution of Within-subject Difference in Subjects Choices: Treatment Group 
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Figure 2: Distribution of Within-subject Difference in Subjects Choices: Control Group 
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Table 1: Baseline Comparison of Choices and Socioeconomic Characteristics 
Variables Pooled 
(1) 
Treatment 
(2) 
Control 
(3) 
Difference 
(4 = 2 – 3) 
 
Panel A: Preferences     
CRRA coefficient 0.76 
(0.44) 
0.74 
(0.39) 
0.79 
(0.54) 
-0.046 
[0.08] 
Competitiveness 0.38 
(0.48) 
0.41 
(0.49) 
0.33 
(0.47) 
0.08 
[0.09] 
Self ranking 4.08 
(0.98) 
4.23 
(0.88) 
3.77 
(1.11) 
0.46** 
[0.18] 
Overconfidence 2.86 
(2.16) 
2.74 
(1.88) 
3.12 
(2.66) 
-0.38 
[0.42] 
Panel B: Socioeconomic characteristics     
Age in years 23.97 
(6.01) 
24.47 
(6.12) 
22.93 
(5.71) 
1.53 
[1.16] 
Schooling (Dummy if completed six or more 
grades of schooling) 
0.86 
(0.34) 
0.85 
(0.35) 
0.89 
(0.30) 
-0.04 
[0.06] 
SC (Dummy if belonged to scheduled caste 
group) 
0.60 
(0.49) 
0.59 
(0.49) 
0.61 
(0.49) 
-0.02 
[0.09] 
ST (Dummy if belonged to the scheduled tribe 
group) 
0.24 
(0.42) 
0.28 
(0.45) 
0.15 
(0.36) 
0.13 
[0.08] 
OBC (Dummy if belonged to the other 
backward group) 
0.06 
(0.23) 
0.048 
(0.21) 
0.076 
(0.27) 
-0.028 
[0.045] 
Married  0.48 
(0.50) 
0.53 
(0.50) 
0.38 
(0.49) 
0.15 
[0.09] 
Household size 6.00 
(2.38) 
5.85 
(2.08) 
6.33 
(2.92) 
-0.48 
[0.46] 
Other income (household income excluding 
individual’s own income) in logs 
7.72 
(7.33) 
7.50 
(7.01) 
8.18 
(8.05) 
-0.68 
[1.43] 
Own House (Dummy if own a house) 0.88 
(0.32) 
0.89 
(0.31) 
0.87 
(0.34) 
0.02 
[0.06] 
ROSCA (Rotating Savings and Credit 
Association) participation (Dummy if member 
of a ROSCA) 
0.11 
(0.32) 
0.12 
(0.33) 
0.10 
(0.31) 
0.02 
[0.06] 
F- value (from the regression of the treatment 
dummy on all variables reported in Panels A 
and B) 
[p-value] 
   1.25 
[0.25] 
Sample Size 121 82 39  
Notes: Standard deviations in parentheses and standard error brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1. 
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Table 2: Strong and Weak Preference Stability 
 
 Percent lying within x standard deviation of mean 
 Strong Preference Stability Weak Preference Stability 
 (x = 0.05) (x = 0.10) 
 2010 2011 2010 2011 
 All T C All T C 
CRRA Coefficient 0 0 17.9 0 30.5 17.9 
Self Ranking 0 20.7 0 27.2 20.7 0 
Over Confidence 0 3.6 0 7.4 19.5 5.1 
Sample size 121 82 39 121 82 39 
 
 
 
Table 3: Summary Statistics of Within Subject Differences in Choices 
 
 
Variables Mean 
 
Null: 
Mean=0 
(p-value) 
Median 
 
25th 
Percentile 
75th 
percentile 	  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)	  
 
Panel A: Control group 
 
     
CRRA coefficient 0.09 
(0.96) 
0.54 0 -0.28 0.28	  
Competitiveness 0.05 
(0.60) 
0.59 0 0 0	  
Self ranking -0.25 
(1.60) 
0.32 0 -1 1	  
Overconfidence -0.97 
(3.06) 
0.05 -0.5 -2 0.66	  
 
Panel B: Treatment group 
 
     
CRRA coefficient 0.15 
(0.82) 
0.09 0 -0.17 0.28	  
Competitiveness 0.07 
(0.62) 
0.29 0 0 0	  
Self ranking -0.22 
(1.24) 
0.11 0 -1 0 
Overconfidence -0.58 
(2.80) 
0.06 -0.29 -2.33 0.5 
Notes: Control group: N = 39, Treatment group: N = 82. Standard deviation in parenthesis.  
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Table 4: Variance Decomposition 
 
 
Variables Total 
variance 
 
Between subject 
variation 
 
Within subject 
variation 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Panel A: Control group 
 
CRRA coefficient 39.89 22.28 17.61 
Competitiveness 17.95 10.95 7 
Self ranking 105.95 55.95 50 
Overconfidence 351.43 154.72 196.70 
Panel B: Treatment group 
 
CRRA coefficient 53.78 25.43 28.35 
Competitiveness 40.61 24.61 16 
Self ranking 157.56 93.56 64 
Overconfidence  572.85 242.84 330.01 
     Notes: Control group: N = 39, Treatment group: N = 82. 
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Table 5: Regression Analysis Controlling for Pre-intervention Socioeconomic 
Characteristics 
 
Within subject 
difference in 
CRRA 
coefficient 
Within subject 
difference in 
Competitiveness 
 
Within subject 
difference in 
Self ranking 
 
Within subject 
difference in 
Over- 
Confidence 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Constant (𝛽! = 0) 
 
-0.82 
(0.57) 
-0.23 
(0.44) 
-0.05 
(0.80) 
-2.28 
(1.98) 
Treatment  (𝛽! = 0) 
 
0.051 
(0.17) 
0.05 
(0.13) 
0.099 
(0.29) 
0.339 
(0.53) 
Treatment + Constant: 
(𝜷𝟎+  𝜷𝟏 = 𝟎) -0.76 (0.55) -.0.18 (0.43) 0.045 (0.78) -1.94 (1.97) 
Age in years 
 
0.027 
(0.02) 
0.004 
(0.015) 
0.018 
(0.026) 
0.072 
(0.08) 
Schooling 
 
-0.013 
(0.16) 
0.022 
(0.19) 
0.15 
(0.37) 
0.58 
(0.74) 
SC 
 
-0.042 
(0.19) 
0.072 
(0.15) 
-0.106 
(0.33) 
0.026 
(0.75) 
ST 
 
0.20 
(0.24) 
-0.07 
(0.15) 
-0.84** 
(0.39) 
-0.82 
(0.89) 
Married 
 
-0.223 
(0.273) 
-0.024 
(0.20) 
-0.13 
(0.36) 
0.008 
(0.82) 
Household size 
 
-0.005 
(0.035) 
-0.0003 
(0.023) 
-0.024 
(0.07) 
-0.009 
(0.10) 
Other income in logs 
 
0.0137 
(0.0132) 
0.0143*** 
(0.005) 
-0.007 
(0.014) 
-0.090 
(0.07) 
ROSCA participation 
 
-0.292* 
(0.15) 
0.03 
(0.16) 
-0.14 
(0.35) 
-0.24 
(0.89) 
Ownership of house 
 
0.32 
(0.24) 
0.002 
(0.18) 
-0.24 
(0.35) 
0.08 
(0.87) 
Observations 121 121 121 121 
R-squared 0.10 0.066 0.087 0.094 
 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Appendix 1: Derivation of the CRRA coefficient from allocation in the 
Investment Game 
 
Assume that individual 𝑖 divides her budget 𝐵 between the risky and the safe 
asset. Assume that 𝐿!  is the amount invested in the risky asset. Then the 
amount invested in the safe asset 𝑆! = 𝐵 − 𝐿!. Assume that 𝐼! is the permanent 
income of the individual, which can be assumed to be zero without loss of 
generality. Individual 𝑖 then maximizes her expected utility, and chooses 𝐿!.  
 𝑀𝑎𝑥:  𝐸 𝑈! 𝐿! , 𝑆!|𝐵 = 0.5𝑈! 𝑆! + 0.5𝑈! 𝑆! + 4𝐿!= 0.5𝑈! 𝐵 − 𝐿! + 0.5𝑈𝑖 𝐵 + 3𝐿!  (1) 
The first order condition for this maximization problem is: 
 −0.5𝑈!! 𝐵 − 𝐿! + 1.5𝑈!! 𝐵 + 3𝐿! = 0𝑈!! 𝐵 − 𝐿! = 3𝑈!! 𝐵 + 3𝐿!  (2) 
Assuming a CRRA utility function, equation (2) implies 
 𝐵 − 𝐿! !! = 3 𝐵 + 3𝐿! !!  
Algebraic manipulation yields 
 𝐿!∗ = 3! ! − 13! ! + 3 𝐵 (3) 
So the optimal investment in the risky asset 𝐿!∗    is a function of the 
coefficient of relative risk aversion 𝜌  and the endowment 𝐵 . Given 𝐿!∗, we 
can solve for 𝜌 as 
 𝜌 = 𝑙𝑛 3𝑙𝑛 𝐵 + 3𝐿!∗𝐵 − 𝐿!∗  (4) 
Given 𝐵 and the optimal investment in the risky asset one can obtain the 
coefficient of relative risk aversion.  
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Appendix 2: English Version of the Subject Instructions9 
 
General Instructions 
Player ID #: __________________________ 
Thank you for your participation. You will be paid Rs. 150 for your participation. There are 2 
tasks that we will ask you to participate in. Performing each task can win you more money in 
cash, in addition to the guaranteed Rs. 150.  
Although, each of you will complete both the tasks, only one of them will be chosen for 
payments. I will toss a coin at the end of the two tasks in front of everyone to determine the 
task you will be paid for. Note that everyone will be paid according to their performances in 
the task determined by the coin toss. 
We are about to begin the first task. Please listen carefully. It is important that you understand 
the rules of the task properly. If you do not understand, you will not be able to participate 
effectively. We will explain the task and go through some examples together. There is to be 
no talking or discussion of the task amongst you. There will be opportunities to ask questions 
to be sure that you understand how to perform each task. At any time whilst you are waiting 
during this experiment, please remain seated, and do not do anything unless instructed by the 
experimenter. Also do not look at others responses at any time during this experiment. 
Finally, each page has an ID# on it. Do not show this ID# to any other participant or allow it 
to be visible to anyone during or after this experiment.  
If you are ready, then we will proceed.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 These are experiment instructions for the 2010 wave. Instructions for the 2011 wave are very 
similar (as explained in the text) and can be requested from the authors.  
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Instructions for the Investment Game 
Player ID #: __________________________ 
We are about to begin the first task. Please listen carefully to the instructions. 
In this task, you are provided Rs.50. You have the opportunity to invest a portion of this 
amount (between Rs.0 and Rs.50). No money will be given at this point. All actual payments 
will be made at the end of the experiment if this task is chosen as the one that you will be paid 
for. 
 
The investment:  
There is an equal chance that the investment will fail or succeed. If the investment fails, you 
lose the amount you invested. If the investment succeeds, you receive 4 times the amount 
invested. 
 
How do we determine the outcome of the investment: 
After you have chosen how much you wish to invest, you will toss a coin to determine 
whether your investment has failed or succeeded, if this task is chosen for payment. If the coin 
comes up heads, you win four times the amount you chose to invest. If it comes up tails, you 
lose the amount invested. You will toss the coin at the end of the experiment, when you come 
to collect your payment. 
 
Here are some examples: 
 
1. You choose to invest nothing. You will get Rs.50 for sure if this task is chosen for 
payment. 
2. You choose to invest all of the Rs.50. Then if the coin comes up heads, you get 
Rs.200. If the coin comes up tails, you get Rs.0. 
3. You choose to invest Rs.30. Then if the coin comes up heads, you get 30x4=120 
from your investment, plus Rs. 20 left from your initial amount. So you will receive a 
total of Rs.140. However, if the coin comes up tails, you will get nothing from the 30 
rupees that you invested. So in this situation you will only get Rs.20 left from the 
initial amount that you chose not to invest. 
 
 
 
Do you have any questions? If you are ready, we will proceed.   
We will call each of you one at a time in the adjoining areas where you will be asked a few 
questions and participate in the described task.  
Once you have finished the task, you will go back to your sitting area. Please make sure that 
you do not converse with anyone. If we find you conversing you will be disqualified from 
further participation and escorted out by one of the experimenters. 
 
  
	   27 
Decision Sheet for the Investment Game 
 
 
Please complete the example below: 
 
1. If you choose to invest Rs 15 and the coin toss comes up heads, what 
will you receive? 
Rs______ x ______ = Rs______ 
 
 Actual Decision: 
2. Amount that I wish to invest: _______________________ 
 
3. Reason for this decision: 
 
  
Player ID #: 
__________________________ 
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Instructions for the Competition Game 
Player ID #: __________________________ 
We are about to begin the next task. Please listen carefully to the instructions. All the money 
that you earn from this task is yours to keep and will be given to you at the end of this 
experiment if this task is chosen as the one that you will be paid for.  
 
For this Task, you will be asked to fill bags with Rajma beans and seal it so its contents 
remain securely inside. We will give a demonstration before you start the task. 
You will be given 1 minute to fill up as many bags as you can. Only bags filled and properly 
sealed will be counted towards your payments.  
You can choose one of two payment options for this task. 
Option 1: 
If you choose this option, you get Re. 4 for each bag that you fill properly in 1 minute.  
Option 2: 
If you choose this option, you will be randomly paired with another person and your payment 
depends on your performance relative to that of the person that you are paired with. If you fill 
up more bags properly than the person you are paired with, you will receive Rs.16 per bag that 
you filled. If you both fill the same number of bags you will receive Rs. 16 per bag. If you fill 
up less number of bags than the person you are paired with, you will receive Rs. 0. 
Note that what you will earn does not depend on the decision of the person that you are paired 
with; it only depends on your own choice of payment, your performance and their 
performance. 
Here are some examples of what could happen: 
1) You choose option 1. You fill 10 bags properly. You will receive 10xRe. 4 = Rs. 40. 
2) You choose option 2. You fill 3 bags properly. The person that you are paired with 
fills 2 bags properly. You will receive 3xRs.16 = Rs. 48.  
3) You choose option 2. You fill 3 bags properly. The person that you are paired with 
fills 4 bags properly. You will receive 3 x 0 = Rs. 0. 
 
Note that these are examples only. The actual decision is up to you. 
The rest of the task will proceed as follows: 
Next, we will call each of you one at a time in the adjoining area where you will be asked a 
few questions and choose your preferred option in the above described task. Once you have 
answered the questions and indicated your preferred option, you will come back to your 
sitting area. Please make sure that you do not converse with anyone at this time. If we find 
you conversing you will be disqualified from further participation and escorted out by one of 
the experimenters. 
Once everyone is back to the seating area we will announce the start of the task and you can 
start filling up the bags. We will make an announcement when there are 30 seconds 
remaining. When time is up, we will say, “Stop the task now”. You should immediately stop 
filling the bags. Please make sure that your hands are in your lap now and not touching any of 
the bags that you filled up. If you do not do this within 2 seconds, you will receive Rs. 0 for 
the entire experiment.  
We will come around and inspect the bags and record the number of bags filled each of you 
managed to fill up.  
Once all counting is done we will flip a coin to decide which of the two tasks will be chosen 
for payments.  
After the coin toss, each of you will be again called one at a time to the adjoining area for the 
final payment procedures. 
 
Are there any questions before we begin? If you are ready, we will proceed.  
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Decision Sheet for the Competition Game 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Performance	  Sheet	  for	  Task	  2	  
 
 
No. of bags filled: _________________________________ 
 
  
Player ID #: 
____________________ 
 
Questions for Task # 2  
Please answer the following questions: 
 
1. Suppose you choose Option 1. You complete 11 bags correctly at the end of 
1 minute. How much money do you receive? 
_______ x Rs________ = ________________ 
 
2. Suppose you choose Option 2. You complete 7 bags correctly. The person 
you are paired with completes 6 bags correctly. How much money do you 
receive? 
_______ x Rs________ = ________________ 
 
3. How many bags do you think you can fill properly in 1 minute? 
_____________________ 
4. If we were to rank everyone’s performance, in the group of people in this 
room, from best to worst, where do you think you would fall compared to 
the average person? Please place a tick next to the rank that you think 
applies to you. 
 
 
__ 1-4  (very above average)  
__ 5-8  (above average) 
__ 9-12  (average) 
__13-16  (below average) 
__ 17-20  (very below average) 
  
5. We now ask you to choose how you want to be paid: according to option 1 
or option 2?   
_____________________ 
6. What was your decision based on? 
 
7. If you chose Option 1, did your decision depend on the payment rate under 
Option 2? If so, what payment rate would have convinced you to choose 
Option 2? 
 
For experimenter use only 
Paired Player ID #: _______________ 
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Instructions for Final Payment Determination 
 
We will now determine what task to pay you for. We will flip a coin; you will all be paid for 
task 1 if Heads come and task 2 if Tails come up. 
If Head comes up, then Task 1 is chosen: Each one of you will flip a coin to determine 
whether your investment succeeded or not. If the coin comes up heads, you win four times the 
amount you chose to invest. If it comes up tails, you lose the amount invested.   
If Tail comes up then Task 2 is chosen: We will pay you according to the choice you had 
indicated earlier.  
If you had chosen option 1, we will pay you according to your performance.  
If you had chosen option 2, we will ask you to pick one chit amongst several chits of paper on 
the front desk. Each chit contains an id number of one of the participants. Your performance 
will be matched with the performance of the participant whose ID number you picked. You 
will be paid according to your relative performance as described earlier. 
Now we will call each of you one at a time like before. Please take your decision sheets with 
your ID# written on it when you come. 
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Visual Charts 
Figure A1: Slides used in the Investment Game in conjunction with the oral instructions 
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Figure A2: Visual slides used in the Competition Game in conjunction with the oral 
instructions 
 
  
  
 
 
 
